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1 INTRODUCTION   
Longer life expectancy has been a long-cherished dream throughout history, 
and today we can expect to live longer than ever, with many of us remaining 
healthy well beyond the age of 80. It is a great achievement to be celebrated. 
However, longer life expectancy also increases the proportion of the elderly 
in the total population, a trend known as population aging. Besides 
increased life expectation, declining fertility plays an important role in 
determining the level and speed of population aging. Developed regions of 
the world have been experiencing population ageing for more than 40 years, 
and this trend is expected to continue for several decades. Furthermore, a 
growing number of developing countries will experience population ageing in 
the first half of the 21st century.   
Population ageing represents a major challenge that is unprecedented 
in human history: a shrinking working population is forced to support a 
growing number of economically inactive persons. This phenomenon gives 
rise to a multitude of pressing issues. How long will declining fertility 
persist in years to come? How rapidly will the number of older people grow? 
How high will the proportion of the elderly be in, say, 2050? What 
socioeconomic impacts can be expected as a result of population ageing? Is 
economic growth slowed down in an ageing world? What policies should be 
pursued to maintain economic growth to allow all segments of society to 
benefit? Can younger people no longer achieve a higher standard of living 
than their parents? Will a vast majority of older persons have to live on an 
inadequate income? How great are the increased costs required to support 
an increasing number of retirees? Who shares them and when? How are 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  2
they shared? Can the cost-sharing be equitable between different 
generations? Will the existing social security system for pensions be 
financially sustainable in the long run? Is it possible for us to avoid any 
adverse economic effects by reforming social security pensions? Do we 
indulge the present at the expense of children living and unborn? What will 
be a time-consistent policy for social security pensions, given the significant 
uncertainties about the likely shape of the world decades into the future? 
Are we wise enough to find solutions to the difficulties arising from longer 
life expectancy?   
This chapter addresses these problems, identifying what is known and 
what is not known. The chapter particularly addresses two questions; firstly, 
how significant is demographic ageing, and secondly, whether there are any 
effective solutions. Section 2 deals with demographic trends and future 
prospects from global and regional perspectives. Section 3 examines the 
economic implications of population ageing. Section 4 discusses pension 
funding issues, and Section 5 gives concluding remarks. 
 
 
2 DEMOGRAPHIC  TRENDS  AND  PROSPECTS   
2.1    Global and Regional Demographic Perspectives 
In 2004, the total world population reached 6.4 billion persons. Its current 
annual growth rate is estimated at 1.3 per cent, considerably lower than its 
peak value of 2.1 per cent during 1965-1970. This slowing of global 
population growth has been primarily due to the almost universal reduction 
of fertility in recent decades. The number of countries with fertility levels 
above five children per woman dropped from 55 in the early 1990s to 34 10 
years later. In contrast, the number of countries with below replacement 
levels of fertility increased from 51 to 62 over the same time period. It is also 
important to note that although most of these low-fertility countries are in 
the developed regions, the number of countries in the developing regions 
with below-replacement fertility doubled to 20.     
Because of such reduced population growth rates for the world as a 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  3
whole in the late 20th century, the outlook today is substantially different 
from the one that demographers had a few decades ago. The 20th century 
was a century of explosive population growth, consequently causing 
unprecedented impacts on various socioeconomic aspects. In contrast, the 
21st century is likely to see the end of world population growth and become 
the century of population ageing (Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov 2004).   
Despite the lower fertility projected for the majority of populations 
and the increased mortality risks for some, the population of the world is 
projected to increase from 6.1 billion in 2000 to 8.9 billion by 2050, as shown 
in Figure 1. This is an expected net increase of 2.8 billion persons during 
the first half of the 21st century.   
 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
These projected net additions suggest that the potential 
still exists for significant population growth in the next few decades. It 
should also be stressed that population dynamics among the regions of the 
world will be increasingly diversified. At present, the population of the more 
developed regions is growing at an annual rate of 0.25 per cent, 
approximately one-sixth of the 1.46 per cent annual rate for the less 
developed regions, and almost one-tenth of the 2.4 per cent for the 49 least 
developed countries. It is important to note, as can be seen in Figure 1, that 
the population of the more developed regions is projected to decline after 
2030, amounting to 1.22 billion persons in 2050, which is only marginally 
larger than 1.19 billion persons in 2000. This implies that most of the net 
additions to the world population will be in the less developed regions, with 
their proportion of the world population increasing from 80 per cent in 2000 
to 86 per cent in 2050. Among the more developed regions, the population 
share of Europe will fall from 12 per cent in 2000 to 7.1 per cent in 2050, as 
depicted in Figure 2, while that of North America will change little at 
approximately 4 per cent for the next 50 years. 
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(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
 
The total fertility rate for the developed regions is expected 
to decline slightly from 1.58 children per woman in 1995-2000 to 1.56 in 
2005-2010. It is anticipated, however, that it will recover gradually to 1.85 
by 2050. In contrast, in the less developed regions as a whole, fertility stood 
at 3.11 in 1995-2000 and is projected to decline to 2.22 in 2030-2035, further 
declining to reach 2.04 by 2050. It is also interesting to note that 
approximately three-fifths of both developed and developing countries are 
currently concerned about their level of fertility for totally opposite reasons. 
According to United Nations’ projections, 28 out of 48 developed countries 
are concerned about the persistence of below-replacement fertility, while 84 
out of 146 developing countries report that their fertility is too high (United 
Nations  2004).   
Life expectancy at birth was 75 years in the more developed regions in 
1995-2000, whereas it was 63 years in the less developed ones. The gap 
between the two groups of countries is expected to narrow over the next 50 
years, reaching 82 years for the former and 73 for the latter. It should be 
noted, however, that a few recent studies on mortality point to the high 
likelihood that life expectancy for countries in the developed regions will 
improve at a considerably faster rate than anticipated (Keilman 1997, for 
example).   
The United Nations’ report World Population Policies 2003 finds that 
high mortality is the most significant population concern for developing 
countries; more than 80 per cent of developing countries list infant and child 
mortality, maternal mortality and HIV/AIDS as the most imminent 
population and development concerns. These mortality risks will be directly 
influenced by the degree to which modern medical care services and public 
health measures become available to the poverty-stricken segment of the 
population in the developing countries, making it difficult to predict future 
conditions with any certainty.   
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(Insert Figure 3 about here) 
 
This report also finds that the most significant 
demographic concern of developed countries relates to low fertility and its 
consequences, including population ageing and a decrease in the 
working-age population. The population in the more developed regions has 
been ageing at a rapid rate over the past few decades. In 1950, the 
proportion of persons aged 60 years old and over was 12 per cent, as shown 
in Figure 3. By 2000, it had overtaken that of children aged 0-14 years (19 
per cent versus 18 per cent) and by 2050, it is expected to be double that of 
children (32 per cent versus 16 per cent). Consequently, as shown in Figure 
4, the median age in the more developed regions rose from 28.6 years in 
1950 to 37.3 in 2000 and is expected to reach 45.2 years in 2050.   
 
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
 
Until recently, many of the governments of developing 
countries perceived population ageing as an issue only for developed 
countries. However, as depicted in Figure 3, the proportion of older persons 
aged 60 and over in developing regions increased from 6 per cent in 1950 to 
8 per cent in 2000, and the tempo of population ageing is anticipated to 
accelerate in the years to come. By 2050, the proportion of older persons is 
expected to rise to 19 per cent, highly comparable to that of contemporary 
developed regions. The median age in these developing regions had changed 
only marginally from 21.4 years in 1950 to 24.3 years in 2000 (United 
Nations 2002), but it is expected to increase by almost 11 years to reach 35 
by 2050, as shown in Figure 4. Subsequent to the United Nations’ 
designation of 1999 as ‘The Year of Older Persons’, many developing 
countries have been increasingly concerned about various population ageing 
problems that require more focused attention in the process of formulating 
long-term development plans (Ogawa 2003).     
Population ageing will result in a rapid increase in the number of 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  6
people aged 60 and over. At the global level, the number will rise from 606 
million in 2000 to 1.9 billion in 2050, as presented in Figure 5. Because of 
their sheer population size, the developing regions are expected to undergo a 
substantially larger increase in the number of old persons than the 
developed countries. The older population in developing countries is 
projected to increase more than four times from 375 million in 2000 to 1.5 
billion by 2050.   
 
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
 
Population ageing has been most marked in Europe. By 2050, those aged 
60 and over will account for more than one-third of its population. At present, 
by country, the population of Japan is the oldest in the entire world, with a 
median age of 41.3 years. Japan’s population is expected to remain the 
oldest in the world over the next half century, with a median age reaching 
53.2 years in 2050.   
A number of East and Southeast Asian countries including Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, China, and Singapore, will face very rapid population 
ageing in the next 50 years. The driving force behind such rapid ageing is an 
unprecedentedly fast decrease in fertility. . These four countries have all 
experienced a similar decline in fertility, although the time period for each 
differs considerably. In the case of Japan, the total fertility rate declined by 
50 per cent, from 4.5 children in 1947 to 2.0 children in 1957. Comparable 
reductions in fertility were recorded in : Singapore from 1966 to 1976, the 
Republic of Korea from 1971 to 1981, and China from 1973 to 1983. This 
decline in fertility is a serious cause of concern to policy makers. In 2003, the 
total fertility rate was well below replacement level in all these countries: 
1.19 children for the Republic of Korea, 1.25 for Singapore, and 1.29 children 
for Japan. The corresponding figure for China in 2004 is estimated to be 1.69 
children. Furthermore, there is no definite indication of a recovery in 
fertility rates in the foreseeable future. 
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As a consequence of their rapid reduction in fertility, these 
Asian countries enjoyed or are still enjoying the so-called ‘demographic 
bonus’, the mechanism of which works as follows. In the process of slowing 
population growth, the labor force continues to grow some years after 
fertility has started to decline, thus increasing the percentage of the 
population engaged in productive activities. Moreover, as a result of reduced 
fertility, more economic resources can be allocated to those in the labor force 
in order to equip them with better physical capital. In addition, increased 
economic resources facilitate improvements not only in the coverage of the 
education program but also its quality (Mason 2001).  
It is important to bear in mind that the patterns of population ageing 
are broadly similar in most countries, but the timing differs substantially. 
For example, among the more developed regions, Japan, Germany, and Italy 
are forerunners, having the highest old-age dependency ratios at the 
present moment, followed by other EU countries. The population of the 
United States, by comparison, is relatively young among developed 
countries. These differences in the stages of population ageing among 
various countries will be sure to stimulate international movements of 
capital, goods and labor, moderating any possible adverse economic effects 
arising from population ageing within each country.   
The number of international migrants increased worldwide by 21 
million persons between 1990 and 2000, the majority of whom moved from 
developing to developed nations (United Nations 2004). On the one hand, a 
sizable proportion of these international migrants are making substantial 
contributions to their host nations. On the other, it is often the case that 
international migration entails the loss of qualified human resources for 
many developing countries and may become a source of political instability 
and socioeconomic tensions in a number of developed countries of 
destination.  
 
2.2  Alternative  Population  Projections  
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useful base for gaining a rough perspective on population change at global, 
regional, and national levels. It is often the case, however, that national 
population projections prepared by each country produce more reliable and 
realistic estimates than those prepared by the United Nations, as they are 
usually based on a relatively rich data set compiled from population 
censuses and numerous sample surveys.   
In their population projections, the United Nations applies the same set 
of assumptions on future longevity and fertility to countries at comparable 
development stages. For example, in the case of the medium variant of the 
most recent population projection prepared by the United Nations, the total 
fertility rate is assumed to become 1.85 in 2045-2050 for all developed 
countries. However, in their national projection, the government of Japan 
assumed a fertility rate of 1.39 in 2050. As a result, Japan’s own estimates of 
its future demographic trajectory is considerably more problematic than the 
United Nations’ projection.   
 
2.3  Remaining  Issues 
There still remains a reliability issue with demographic projections. 
Short-run demographic projections are likely to be more accurate in 
comparison to economic projections, but longer-run projections are far from 
satisfactory. One of the primary reasons for this is a lack of reliable 
statistical data, especially in the less developed regions where long 
time-series data on mortality, fertility, and migration are least likely to be 
available.   
In order to enhance the reliability of projected results, there is a long 
list of research studies that need to be conducted. For example, it is not 
entirely clear why some countries have a lower fertility rate than other 
countries, and why some regions within each country have lower fertility 
than others. Still controversial are the links between the social security 
system and fertility, and the link between female labor force participation 
and fertility. Least known are the quantitative effects of global ageing on 
migration. Another area for investigation is whether any family-friendly 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  9
policies will induce a steady increase in fertility.   
 
 
3  ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION AGEING   
This section considers how population aging is likely to affect the economic 
well-being of each country; if patterns of likely losers and winners can be 
discerned, and how policies adopted can influence economic outcomes.   
 
3.1  A  Closed  Economy 
Economists usually discuss the effects of ageing in two ways: adopting either 
a macroeconomic approach, or individualistic one. The macroeconomic 
approach often implies a pessimistic view on population ageing, while the 
individualistic approach is more likely to induce an optimistic scenario. 
 
The macroeconomic approach assumes a following production 




where Y is national output (or gross domestic product, GDP) of a country, L 
the labor force, and K the capital stock. As the population ages, the relative 
size of the labor force over the total population will be reduced. In some 
countries, the labor force will even decrease in absolute size. Unless this is 
compensated by an increase in total factor productivity (A) and/or an 
increase in the capital stock, the national output will decline. The economic 
presence of these countries in the world will then shrink. This line of 
thinking implies a pessimistic view.   
Smaller countries are not necessarily poorer ones, however. An 
individualistic approach considers not the absolute size of national output, 
but the per capita output (Y/N), where N is the total population. 
 
Y/N=Aɾf (L/N, K/L) 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  10
 
Per capita output can even increase in spite of a shrinking 
population with a falling national output, if labor force participation (L/N) or 
the capital labor ratio (K/L) increases. People can be wealthier even when 
the population is ageing or declining. This can be a cause for optimism, and 
thus the absolute size of the population does not always matter in an 
individualistic context. What really matters is labor force participation, 
capital intensity and the speed of increases in factor productivity. Economic 
implications will vary depending on different speeds of changes in these 
factors. Astute policies can bring about preferable results by    affecting 
these factors.   
The first important factor is labor force participation. Labor force 
participation rates vary among different age- and gender-groups, which are 
dominated by labor market entry and exit ages along with child-raising 
circumstances. They can be increased by earlier labor market entry ages 
through structural education reform and later labor market exit ages 
through pension reform. Pensions often have the incentive effect of inducing 
early retirement (see Chapters 10 and 16 of this volume). Pension reform to 
encourage later retirement is crucial for an ageing society, to minimize 
economic damage resulting from population ageing. Female labor force 
participation can rise, if child-raising does not deter women from engaging 
in paid employment. The established gender roles between men and women 
in employment and work within the home need to be reconsidered, and 
difficulties in reconciling paid employment with child care responsibilities 
can be mitigated through more family-friendly policies.   
The second important factor is capital intensity. Population ageing will 
have a negative effect on increases in the labor force, directly leading to a 
higher capital labor ratio. If population ageing induces a lower saving rate, 
then it will usually reduce the capital labor ratio through decreased 
investment. Overall changes in capital intensity is then determined by these 
two opposing factors. Empirical studies verify their net effect, which differ 
country to country.   9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  11
A simple lifecycle model implies that population ageing will lead to a 
decrease in national saving rates (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954). Still 
controversial is its empirical evidence, however, since in some developed 
countries no reduction in savings has been observed (BÖrsch-Supan 2003). 
National savings depend on not only a retirement motive (individuals saving 
for their own retirement), but also on other saving motives including 
precaution, bequest, education, and housing. National savings depend on the 
public-private mix of pension schemes. More prefunding for retirement 
through increased private initiatives might induce more savings. It should 
be remembered, however, that a higher saving rate means sacrificing 
consumption to some extent, possibly leading to lower utility or well-being. 
The maximum per capita consumption is attained when the economy is on 
the Golden Rule (Phelps 1966). A higher saving rate will be necessary if the 
existing capital labor ratio is below the optimal level on the Golden Rule. If 
not, people will opt for a lower rate of savings (Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1983).   
The third important factor is productivity. Productivity growth can 
bring higher economic well-being even with an aging population. There is no 
reliable data currently available, however, on age-specific labor productivity. 
Higher productivity may be possible through human capital investment (a 
higher quality of education) and market-oriented job training with fuller 
labor mobility. Needless to say, technological innovation is also significant in 
this area. An aging economy needs stronger incentives for building a higher 
innovative capacity. More research is urgently needed to enable us to 
understand whether ageing societies are likely to suffer from a productivity 
decline.   
 
3.2  An  Open  Economy 
People in a country with an ageing population can enjoy capital income from 
foreign direct investment. GNP (gross national product) is larger than GDP 
if foreign direct investment creates large returns. GNP might be the more 
relevant indicator of when the country enjoys a substantial income from 
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than labor across countries. With a deregulation policy on foreign direct 
investment, an country with an older population can benefit from greater 
returns from direct investment than countries whose population is just 
beginning to age, or is still relatively young. Moreover, international nature 
of the flow of capital may lessen the possible melt-down of the asset market 
when the baby boomers decumulate their assets after retirement. .   
Thus, the degree of capital mobility is quite crucial. Obviously, there is 
home bias in international portfolio choice, due to capital market frictions 
including tax provisions, different levels of information on country risks, and 
instabilities in global financial markets. An open economy also facilitates the 
international flow of goods and services, through which domestic consumers 
usually benefit.This too could mitigate the economic difficulties induced by 
population ageing in any country. Migration is the other positive source of 
well-being for people in an ageing country. Our understanding is still quite 
primitive, however, as to how much global ageing will affect migration.   
In summary, smoother international movements of capital, goods and 
services, and labor can moderate any adverse economic effects of population 
ageing (BÖrsch-Supan 2004). Deregulations for stimulating these 
international movements will be required, together with reforms of existing 
socio-economic systems which were established when the country had 
younger populations. Overall, we understand the basic channels through 
which population ageing will exert economic effects, but lack intensive 
empirical research studies that would generate more specific quantitative 
data for individual countries with aging populations.   
 
 
4    AGING AND PENIONS FUNDING 
As ageing becomes a global phenomenon, the big challenge for the 21st 
century will be to provide an adequate income to older persons in ageing 
societies. In a few decades time, the overwhelming majority of the world’s 
older populations will live in developing countries which at present have no 
or only limited social protection in old age. Establishing and extending 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  13
appropriate social security programs will be an absolute priority in the 
national agenda of these countries.   
The situations is quite different in developed countries. Most of them 
set up social security programs when their populations were young enough, 
thereby providing an adequate retirement income to the majority of retirees. 
The coverage of social security is a comparatively minor issue in these 
countries at present, although a growing number of atypical employment 
patterns and migrant workers are inducing serious drop-out, thus 
threatening the base of participation in some countries. Instead, they will 
face the prospect of unsustainable pension obligations as their population 
ages. Some economists warn that, if governments continue on the course 
they have currently set, people in most developed countries will see 
sky-rocketing rates of social security contributions, drastically reduced 
retirement benefits, high inflation and a ruined domestic currency (Kotlikoff 
and Burns 2004). These difficulties form the so-called ‘demographic 
time-bomb’.  
Can pension reforms ensure that the old age security systems of 
developed countries will be financially sustainable in the long run? To do so, 
developed countries need to contain the increasing costs of social security 
pensions, while maintaining adequacy of pension benefits.    This section 
addresses these problems, highlighting gaps and disputed issues in our 
current knowledge..   
 
4.1  Growing  Anxieties 
Most developed countries have a pay-as-you-go defined benefit system for 
social security pensions. This system was a success story when the economy 
enjoyed a relatively high speed of growth with relatively young populations. 
It has been effective in reducing poverty among the elderly and also in 
providing people with a stable standard of living after retirement. Since 
1980 or a little earlier, however, the pay-as-you-go defined benefit plans for 
pensions have been facing serious and growing criticisms in these countries. 
Among others issues, the financial burden is becoming very severe with the 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  14
declining rate of economic growth associated with population ageing. The 
system is losing popularity with younger people. 
It is becoming difficult and undesirable for these countries to increase 
the contribution rate for social security pensions. Contributions to social 
security pensions operate as ‘penalties on employment’. Further hikes in the 
contribution rate run the risk of damaging domestic companies that are 
facing mega-competition on a global scale, with adverse effects on the 
economy, including a higher unemployment rate, lower economic growth, 
lower saving rates and so on. Hikes in the contribution rate will also induce 
an incentive compatibility problem. For younger cohorts, the internal rate of 
return in the social security pension system is likely to be relatively low or 
even negative, leading contributors to find that their participation in the 
system does not pay. The Japanese case gives a typical example (Takayama 
2003). 
Another criticism leveled at the current pay-as-you-go defined benefit 
plan is that it exerts perverse redistribution effect. Through a massive 
transfer of income by social security pensions, the rich elderly are becoming 
richer, while other elderly people are still suffering from a low income. 
Political resistance to cutting the benefits level or to further increasing the 
normal pensionable age has been very strong. Many people feel that the 
government is breaking its promise with them, leading to a loss of credibility, 
as people increasingly mistrust the commitment of their governments to 
providing them with an adequate retirement income. 
 
4.2  Pension  Debate 
The publication of the World Bank’s Averting Old Age Crisis in 1994 
prompted a heated debate on pensions world-wide. It identified three 
functions of old age security programs: redistribution, saving, and insurance, 
claiming that each function should be separated. It proposed a recipe 
involving three pillars: a publicly managed mandatory first pillar to combat 
poverty, a privately managed mandatory savings second pillar and a third 
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The 1994 World Bank approach faced immediate counter criticisms by 
social security experts who contended that the recipe would require 
individuals to bear significant risks (Beattie and McGillivray 1995). A 
rejoinder followed (James 1996) and a vast literature has been built up 
dealing with all aspects of retirement income provisions (Arnold,Graetz and 
Munnell 1998; Diamond 1996; Feldstein 1998; Fultz 2002; Gill, Packard and 
Yermo 2004; Gruber and Wise 1999; ILO 2001; OECD 1998, among others). 
The debate centered on the design of the second pension pillar. The World 
Bank held a conference on new ideas about old age security five years later, 
in order to re-examine both the evidence and the thinking on pensions and 
retirement security (Holzmann and Stiglitz 2001).   
There are several points of agreement which seem to have been reached 
through the pension debates of the past ten years. First, the pay-as-you-go 
defined benefit system has been working not as a pure insurance system but 
rather as a tax-and-transfer system involving huge amounts of income 
transfers between generations. To some extent it is a problem between 
managers and trade unions, but mainly is a problem between generations. 
This produces a political difficulty: older people are committed voters while   
younger people and future generations currently have decidedly weak or no 
political powers. The interests of future generations are likely to be 
neglected in the political arena.     
Second, the nature of the intergenerational contract is difficult for many 
people to understand. Maintaining a fixed rate of replacement in gross 
income terms is by no means ‘a contract.’ It is actually quite risky, pushing 
its costs entirely onto actively working generations or future generations. 
The benefits and contributions in pay-as-you-go defined benefit plans need 
some flexibility to respond to changing circumstances. The replacement rate 
embedded in the law is less a ‘promise’ in a strict sense, but the starting 
point of an ongoing process of adaptation to a changing and unpredictable 
world. Constant adjustments will be required to keep the system viable, and 
these will be viewed as ‘political risks’ (Diamond 1996). 
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countries including Sweden, Germany and Japan to prevent political risks in 
the future. An automatic balance mechanism or a sustainability factor has 
been introduced to adjust pension benefits to respond flexibly to never-ending 
changes in demographic and economic conditions (Heller 2003; Settergren 
2001; Takayama 2005). Financial sustainability is often accomplished at the 
price of income adequacy after retirement. For instance, the United Kingdom 
succeeded in reducing social security benefits by 1996 to make the system 
financially sustainable. The system may face another problem of political 
sustainability in the future, however, since its benefit level will not be 
sufficient for many people to maintain a decent life after retirement.   
Third, social security pensions are consumption allocation mechanisms, 
by transferring resources from workers to pensioners when pensions are paid. 
Under the pay-as-you-go system, the transfer is direct through contributions or 
taxes paid by workers. Under the funded scheme, pensioners liquidate their 
accumulated assets by selling to workers. In both cases, the disposable income 
of workers is reduced by the amount of resources transferred to retirees.   
Supporting an increasing number of retired persons is possible if output 
grows. Economic output depends crucially on the supply of workers, and 
thus increasing the labor force participation of elderly persons, women and 
young adults will be required to maintain this supply (see Chapter 12 of this 
volume). In the light of this, we need to approach the question of funding 
from the perspective of circumventing constraints on economic growth. We 
must ask which revenue sources will slow down growth the least. Is the 
answer a wage (or payroll) tax or not? It should be remembered that the tax 
on consumption does not function as a direct levy on the saving and 
investment that powers the economy. It will make sense in some countries to 
fund part of the increased costs of a greying society by raising the rate of 
consumption-based tax.   
Fourth, people in the more developed countries are increasingly 
concerned with the ‘taste of pie’ rather than the ‘size of the pie’ or the 
‘distribution of the pie’ (Takayama 2003). When it comes to social security 
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buying. It has become of secondary concern how big or how fair they are. The 
basic design of the pension program should be incentive-compatible. 
Contributions should be much more directly linked with old-age pension 
benefits, while an element of social adequacy should be incorporated in a 
separate tier of pension benefits financed by other sources.   
The incentive-compatibility problem can be avoided with the notional 
defined contribution (NDC) plan, which has already been introduced in 
Sweden, Italy, Poland and Latvia. It will demonstrate to the public that 
everybody will get a pension equivalent to his/her own contribution 
payments. ‘Every penny counts’ was the selling phrase in Sweden when the 
NDC plan was advocated in early 1990s. Unfunded DC schemes can make 
transparent the relationship between contributions and benefits, thereby 
deterring evasion and other distorting behavior, and can also eliminate 
undesirable redistribution within the same cohort of individuals (Holzmann 
and Palmer 2005).   
On the other hand, the NDC plan does have some disadvantages. Risks 
will be entirely on the shoulders of pensioners as there is no risk sharing 
between old parents and their children. Nor will it be easy for NDC plans to 
provide social security in the event of the invalidity or death of the 
breadwinner. Furthermore, the notional rate of return is usually set to equal 
wage increases, long-term averages of which are likely to be lower than 
long-term interest rates. If this is to be the case in the future, NDC benefit 
levels will be potentially lower than those under real DC plans.   
 
4.3  Strengthening  Private  Initiatives 
The majority of people in almost all developed countries are reluctant to 
accept further increases in taxes and/or social security contributions. Under 
these circumstances, people must be encouraged to become self-reliant after 
retirement. With stronger tax incentives, private initiatives will grow in due 
course. If this occurs, the future picture of distribution of income after 
retirement may be quite different.    
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such as understandability (or transparency) and offers a flexible response to 
increasing diversity of life-style (increasing heterogeneity, increasing 
freedom to choose the place of work, working hours, and working periods, 
widening choices of no-kids, divorce, and remarriage, etc.). It also 
encourages people to be responsible and self-reliant, penalising irresponsible 
behavior that imposes cost on others, especially on future generations who 
have no political influence today. 
Funded defined contribution plans will face several difficulties, however. 
First, the market rate of return is quite volatile in the short-term, producing 
large differentials. The rate of return from the financial market may decline 
with the ongoing population aging, and with an ample supply of funded 
money. It is not inflation-proof. Consequently insured people will face an 
investment risk (Campbell and Feldstein 2001). The income disparity after 
retirement will widen, and an increasing proportion of the elderly will suffer 
from low income. Some of the current retirees, namely asset-holders, will 
also suffer loss from a possible decline in the market rate of return on their 
assets. 
Second, we must have appropriate regulations for funded schemes. We 
can learn from experiences of the Anglo-Saxon countries, but so far our 
knowledge about them remains insufficient. A particular gap in 
understanding concerns institutions against investment risks (see Chapter 
25 of this volume). Third, the problem of administrative costs (Shoven 2000) 
will particularly affect low-income earners who will be forced to accept a 
relatively low rate of return. 
Voluntary prefunding seems inevitable. Better instruments to minimize 
risks involved in the funded system are needed, as well as better 
understanding of individual behaviors induced by different provisions, the 
macro economic impacts, and the distributional outcomes from increased 
prefunding. 
 
4.4  No  Single  Solution  
Each country faces the dilemma that policy makers seek to make pensions 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  19
the vehicle for too many policy objectives. Japan, Singapore and China are 
typical examples (Takayama 2005; Asher 2005; Chen 2005). This runs 
counter to the standard theory of policy assignment, which suggests that 
each policy objective can be best attained only if it is matched with a 
different policy instrument.   
Different objectives are often competing. Promoting later retirement 
may induce higher unemployment for younger people. Encouraging 
occupational and individual pensions can lead to early retirement. Tax 
smoothing or advance increases in the contribution rate for sound financing 
in the long-term will cause higher unemployment in the short-term. 
Financial sustainability often comes at the price of income adequacy in 
retirement. Solutions will be different depending on which objective is more 
important.  
For an ageing society, increased costs are inevitable to secure a stable 
income for people after retirement, and to prevent poverty. We have no 
painless solutions for the future; no reforms without tears. The type of pain 
that we will have to bear will be different from country to country. It 
depends on a whole host of variables: the potential for economic growth; the 
balance between solidarity and self-reliance; perceptions about income 
disparity after retirement; understanding of intergenerational equity; the 
credibility of the government commitment; regulatory competence against 
investment risks, and the development of the capital market, and so on. 
 
 
5   CONCLUSION   
Aging is taking place on a global scale in the 21st century. The economic 
implications of ageing can be seen in both a pessimistic and an optimistic light, 
depending on different analytical frameworks, each country’s specific 
conditions, and policies to be adopted. Increasing and smoother international 
movements of capital, goods and services, and labor can moderate any adverse 
economic effects of population ageing. Overall, higher economic growth can 
mitigate the difficulties in ageing societies, and employment with increasing 9 Takayama and Ogawa 13 Apr KW 9 Apr  20
labor force participation of elderly persons, women and young adults carries 
the crucial key to financing adequate retirement income in the future.     
Providing adequate income to senior citizens is a big challenge for the   
world with its aging populations. Enormous efforts will be necessary for 
developing countries to extend the coverage of social protection in old age in 
order to prevent insufficient retirement income for the vast majority of older 
people. Developed countries have been struggling to contain social security 
pension costs with the focus on increasing the normal pensionable age and 
introducing an automatic balance mechanism, together with giving a 
minimum income guarantee to older persons. Scenarios of bankrupt schemes 
for social security pensions will turn out to be overly simplistic and groundless. 
There are no magic bullets, however. No painless solutions for the future. No 
single policy will be sufficient on its own in addressing the long term 
challenges.  
No one can claim to see clearly all the changes that lie in the decades 
ahead, but the challenge is hard to ignore. Missing from the picture is a more 
explicit consideration of economic consequences arising from population ageing. 
Missing as well, is a far greater commitment to research on the magnitude of 
the principal long-term risks in an ageing society, their sensitivity to key 
assumptions, and their implications. 
In the end, life is still risky. We have to realize that we cannot completely 
eliminate all the risks associated with living longer. What we can do is to make 
greater efforts to control these risks at a minimum level. 
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* Indicates ratio of population size in the developed region to population size in the developing region.




















Figure 2. Population growth by region, 2000-2050
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision, 2003.
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